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1 Introduction
In this article, we study the principal-agent relation and associated agency conflicts in re-
spect to corporate payout determination in Asia. In particular, we examine the importance
of distinctive creditor and minority shareholder rights in respect to payout policy determi-
nation across a wide variety of investor protection environments present in the region.
In a seminal contribution to the literature on international corporate governance, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) find that higher dividends internation-
ally are an ‘outcome’ of better minority shareholder protection regulation, at the country
level, which enables these stakeholders to negotiate effectively with management and con-
trolling shareholders. Over the last decade, several researchers have found corroborative
evidence in favor of managers distributing more cash as dividends in countries with bet-
ter minority shareholder protection regulation. For example, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and
Servaes (2003) find evidence that firms incorporated in stronger shareholder protection
countries hold less cash. Further, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006) find that cash is
worth less to the minority shareholders invested in the firms in low-protection countries as a
result of legal frameworks which facilitate the expropriation of this cash by the management
and controlling shareholders.
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) and Jiraporn, Kim and Kim (2011) find that individual firm-
level corporate governance quality also has a significant impact on its dividend policy.
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) simultaneously control for minority shareholder protection both
at the firm- and the country-level, and find that firms with weak minority shareholder pro-
tection, which are incorporated in countries that permit weak minority shareholder rights,
hold more cash. Jiraporn, Kim and Kim (2011) show that stronger governance at firm-level
not only leads to a higher propensity to pay but also to higher payout amounts. In addi-
tion, Brockman and Unlu (2011), indicate that the firm’s disclosure environment plays a
significant role in dividend payout policy determination through its effect on agency costs.
Although it is therefore evident that both firm- and country-level measures of potential
agency conflicts have both been found to determine corporate payouts, Harford, Mansi and
Maxwell (2008) show that a firm’s cash holding is principally influenced by the country-level
minority shareholder protection rather than firm-level protection. Taken together, these in-
ternational studies establish a pronounced linkage between minority shareholder rights at
the firm- and country-level and cash holding as well as the disbursement of dividends at the
firm-level. These studies suggest that in low-protection countries, management can stock-
pile cash while in high-protection countries legal frameworks enable minority shareholders
to obligate the management to distribute cash and this manifests itself in the form of higher
payout ratios in these countries.
In a complementary strand of the literature, researchers have turned to examining the
importance of distinctive creditor and minority shareholder rights in respect to payout pol-
icy determination.1 Brockman and Unlu (2009) use country-level creditor rights indices to
document that creditors can strongly influence the management to adopt a more restrictive
payout policy as a ‘substitute’ mechanism for weak creditor rights to minimize the firm’s
1There are also several studies which examine the impact of the agency costs of debt on dividend policies
at the individual country level, hence holding constant the creditor rights environment (Smith and Warner,
1979, Kalay, 1982 and Easterbrook, 1984).
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agency cost of debt. In fact, they report that the agency costs of debt play a more influ-
ential role in dividend policies internationally than the agency costs of equity. In a similar
vein, Chae, Kim and Lee (2009) find international evidence that firms with higher external
financing costs undertake a more restrictive payout policy in order to maximize the value
of the firm.
In this article, we adopt logit and tobit regression model specifications, together with
the Fama-Macbeth (1973) hypothesis testing methodology, to build on the findings pre-
sented in Brockman and Unlu (2009), in respect to the impact of creditor and minority
shareholder protection regulation on firm dividend policies. Unlike in the extant literature,
which generally has a dominance of civil law countries in its sample (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000, von Eije and Megginson, 2008 and Brockman and
Unlu, 2009, 2011), our Asian sample of ten developing countries includes an approximately
balanced data set of five common law and five civil law countries. This allows a poten-
tially insightful investigation of the impact of common and civil law regulatory frameworks
on dividend policies in respect to emerging economies exclusively. In addition, our mea-
surements of country level creditor and minority shareholder rights are preferred to those
which are adopted in Brockman and Unlu (2009). Specifically, while we adopt a dynamic
measurement, 2005 through to 2009, of creditor and minority shareholder rights indices,
Brockman and Unlu (2009) avail of a static measurement of these rights.2 In our investi-
gation of the impact of investor rights on firms’ dividend policies we follow Brockman and
Unlu (2009) in controlling for firm maturity, leverage, profitability, growth opportunities,
size and cash holdings. In addition, we extend this set of control variables to include the
ownership concentration (Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001 and Chemmanur, He, Hu and Liu,
2010), earnings reporting frequency (von Eije and Megginson, 2008), stock market liquidity
and market capitalization (Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2006) as well as income risk
(von Eije and Megginson, 2008) and privatization (Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh,
1994 and von Eije and Megginson, 2008) variables. Finally, following Brockman and Unlu
(2009), in respect to the determination of dividend policies, we consider the determination
of dividend omissions but we also consider the determination of dividend initiations, large
dividend increases and large dividend reductions.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, using a sample of up to 52,778
firm years and allowing for traditional payout determination variables, the Asian firms lo-
cated in relatively high investor protection, common law countries, have a greater tendency
to pay out and, if they do so, they tend to pay out more. Second, we also examine the
importance of distinctive creditor and minority shareholder rights in respect to payout pol-
icy determination. The amount of pay out, and the decisions to initiate dividends and
distribute a large increase in the dividends, are determined by the balance of these ‘stake-
holders rights’ and the corresponding capacities of these stakeholders to influence insiders
to retain or disgorge cash, respectively. Albeit, the decision to pay out (excluding the de-
cision to initiate the pay out of dividends), is conducted to promote, from the perspectives
of creditors and minority shareholders, the reputation of the firm. Finally, our findings
indicate that creditors exert significant and far reaching influence over corporate payout
policy decision-making, however, in Asia the importance of the agency costs of equity pre-
2The dynamic measurements of creditor and minority shareholder investor rights, which are sourced at
the World Bank, are not available prior to 2005.
3
dominate. These findings are robust to an extensive set of control variables and model
specifications.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In section 2, our data set is outlined
and the constructed proxy explanatory variables are described with a particular focus on
creditor and minority shareholder investor protection regulation variables. In section 3,
we present summary statistics at the firm-, country- and industry-levels. In section 4, we
present our empirical findings. Finally, a summary and concluding remarks are presented
in the last section.
2 Data
In this section, we describe the sample of firms and both the dependent and independent
variables adopted in this study. The dataset of independent variables, for our study, com-
prises an extensive set of country-specific investor protection variables and a well informed
set of firm-specific characteristics, as detailed in table 1. We obtain our firm-level data from
Worldscope via Thomson One Banker Analytics. We obtain our country level investor pro-
tection data from the World Bank’s Doing Business database. With regard to both our
dependent and our independent variables, we adopt a real US$ numeraire currency, with a
base year for real value calculations set at 1990. To convert our nominal values into real
values, we use country specific consumer price indices sourced at the World Bank in its
World Development Indicators database.
Our dataset extends from 1990 to 2009 as a result of the limited availability of Asian
related data at Worldscope prior to this period. We end the sample of data in our study
in 2009 to minimize the effect of the sub-prime crisis on our firm specific control vari-
ables, which are included, as lagged variables (up to 2008), in our model specifications.
Our dataset is also constrained to include the listed firms headquartered in the ten Asian
countries examined in this study. In order to avoid the problem of survivorship bias we
search for both active and inactive, i.e., either dead or suspended listings in Worldscope.
In addition, we eliminate firms with duplicate International Security Identifying Numbers
(ISIN) and foreign firms. Following Fama and French (2001), we exclude utilities (SIC Code
4900-4949) and financial firms (SIC Code 6000-6999)3. Finally, firms with dividends which
are greater than their total sales and firms with negative dividends, sales or market-to-book
ratios are excluded from our analyses.
Our set of constraints yields 5,840 industrial listed firms across the ten Asian countries
examined in this study. Our sample is proportionately divided between civil law (41%) and
common law countries (59%). In particular, the civil law countries in the sample include
China (686 firms), Indonesia (276 firms), Philippines (121 firms), South Korea (620 firms)
and Taiwan (657 firms) and the common law countries observed include Hong Kong (655
firms), India (1,369 firms), Malaysia (696 firms), Singapore (363 firms) and Thailand (397
firms).
[Please insert table 1 about here]
3The payout policy and external financing of utilities is highly regulated. The financial reporting systems
of financial firms differs from the wider sample of firms in our sample.
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2.1 Dividend pay out
We study the impact of investor protection, while controlling for an extensive set of firm-
specific characteristics, on the firm’s likelihood to pay and the pay out amount by conducting
logistic and tobit regression analyses. To examine the likelihood to pay, we use a dividend
payout dummy (RDIV) which is equal to one if the firm initiates a common cash dividend,
otherwise it is equal to zero. In our tobit regressions, following von Eije and Megginson
(2008), we scale the real amount paid as common cash dividend by calculating its natural
logarithm. In this way, we purposefully avoid the inclusion of firm-specific accounting data
as a component of our dependent variable, e.g. by scaling cash dividends by total assets,
sales or earnings (see, inter alia, Fama and French, 2001 and Denis and Osobov, 2008). In
order to capture the essence of actual (real) common cash dividends paid, we use a natural
logarithm scaled pay out dependent variable.
2.2 Investor protection variables
Our investor protection variables are sourced at the World Bank’s Doing Business database
and comprise three categories of variables: a creditor rights variable (a Legal Rights Index,
LegRInd), a minority shareholder rights variable (an Investor Protection Index, ShRights)
and a variable indicating the quality of the background country-level regulatory framework
(RegQua). These investor protection variables extend over a five year period from 2005
to 2009 and the variables are updated annually. Our decision to measure the extent of
minority shareholder and creditor rights follows in the vein of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1998, 2000) and Brockman and Unlu (2009), respectively. In fact, the
specific Legal Rights Index which we adopt is originally constructed in Djankov, McLeish
and Schleifer (2007) and the Investor Protection index, which we adopt, is introduced in
Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Schleifer (2008).
The Legal Rights Index (LegRInd) measures the extent to which collateral and bankruptcy
laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index
ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that these laws are better designed to ex-
pand access to credit. The adopted minority share holder rights index (ShRights) measures
the capacity of these shareholder to protect themselves against management and directors
misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. In particular, the index of shareholder rights
reflects three attributes of investor protection, these are shareholders ability to sue offi-
cers and directors for misconduct (ShInd), the directors liability for self-dealing (DirLia)
and the transparency of related-party transactions in the form of disclosure (DisInd). The
index of shareholder rights (ShRights) is calculated as the the equally weighted mean of
ShInd, DirLia and DisInd for each country annually. The index ranges from 0 to 10, with
higher values indicating superior minority shareholder protection. The data for the Le-
gal Rights index and the Investor Protection index are sourced in surveys of corporate
lawyers with regard to securities regulations, company law and court rules of evidence.
Unlike the perception-based index of creditor rights and anti-director rights adopted by La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998, 2000) and Brockman and Unlu (2009),
which was based on a somewhat ad-hoc selection of variables (Jappelli, 2010 and Haidar,
2009), the outlined Legal Rights and Investor Protection indices provide relatively objective
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measures of creditor and minority shareholder protection regulation and enforcement.4
Finally, we extend our model specifications to incorporate an additional governance
factor to account for the overall quality of a country’s regulatory framework (RegQua).
This regulatory quality (RegQua) variable aims to capture the government’s ability to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations which permit and promote private
sector development.
2.3 Control variables
We use a well informed set of firm-specific control variables which have been studied in the
corporate payout policy determination literature to account for various dividend payout the-
ories. Following Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)
and Brockman and Unlu (2009), we assess the empirical importance of the agency-cost
based theory of dividend determination by controlling for cash holdings to assets (CASH)
and debt to assets (LR). In addition, Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010), report the importance
of leverage to mitigate agency costs in multinational firms. Following Chemmanur, He, Hu
and Liu (2010) and Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2013) we control for ownership concentration
by averaging the ratio of number of closely held shares to total outstanding common equity
(OWN) from 1990 to 2009. In respect to the development of the firm’s investment opportu-
nity set (Fama and French 2001 and Denis and Osobov 2008), we include the annual change
in real total assets (DAA) in our model specifications. Following, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and
Stulz (2006), we include retained earnings to total equity (RETE) as a proxy for the phase
of the financial life-cycle of the firm and in the spirit of Fama and French (2001) and Grul-
lon and Michaely (2002), we adopt (percentile rank of) market capitalization (SIZE), as an
indication of the phase of the firm’s financial life-cycle.
In addition, following Lintner (1956) and Miller and Rock (1985) we control for the
earnings before interest after tax to total assets (EA). Bozos, Nikolopoulos and Ramgandhi
(2011) report that earnings on the London Stock Exchange may contain important infor-
mation content, in relation to average abnormal stock market returns, particularly during
periods of economic growth and stability. de Jong, van Dijk and Veld (2003) highlight the
role of free cash flows in determining pay out. Free cash flow is related to earnings and is
the cash flow that remains subsequent to optimal capital budgeting decisions. Anticipated
income uncertainty is expected to have a significant influence on the firm’s likelihood to
pay due to the deteriorating effect on the firm value and higher cost of external financing.
To operationalize this aspect, we include income risk (SDS), as suggested by von Eije and
Megginson (2008). We also follow Wood (2001) and von Eije and Megginson (2008) to
include Earning Reporting Frequency (ERF). Further, we account for the country-specific
characteristics by following von Eije and Megginson (2008) to include a dummy (equal to
1) for the privatized firms (Private) and common law countries (COM). Finally, in line
with Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), we control for the size of the stock market
4In line with Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson, 2008, we would additionally wish to account for,
firm-level governance indices which increase with minority shareholder protection. However, these firm level
indices are not available at present, across both minority shareholder and creditor rights. For example, if
we were to avail of the Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson, 2008 dataset, this would account only for
minority shareholder rights indices at the firm level in a subset of our Singapore and Hong Kong sampled
firms.
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(StTraVal) and stock market liquidity (StTraVol) from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators.
We winsorize variables defined as ratios, namely the earnings ratio (EA), the asset
growth rate (DAA) and retained earnings to total equity (RETE) at upper and lower 0.5%
levels, while we winsorize variables such as cash holdings to assets (CASH), the leverage
ratio (LR) and income risk (SDS) at upper 0.5% levels only as these variables have a
minimum lower bound value of zero. The predicted signs between our firm-specific control
variables and dividends are as follows: SIZE (+); EA (+); CASH (+/-)5; DAA (-); LR
(-); RETE (+); ERF (+/-)6; SDS (-); OWN (+/-)7; Private (+); COM (+), StTraVal (+);
StTraVol (+).
3 Summary statistics
3.1 Firm-specific and country-level
Table 2 presents our main sample summary statistics in each of the ten countries studied
as well as for the common and civil law country groupings. As a majority of payout
disclosures (N) involves actual payouts (Payers) both across country groupings and across
individual countries, the sample has a majority of dividend paying firms. There is a higher
average payout per firm, in terms of both cash dividends (primarily China and Taiwan)
and share repurchases (South Korea), in civil law countries than in common law countries.
Among common law countries (Panel A), Hong Kong and Singapore are the significant
payers in respect to both aggregate and average amounts. The principal distinctions across
explanatory variables in respect to country groupings relate to the relatively large firms
in civil law countries (Panel B) which tend to be less closely held than their counterparts
in common law countries. In addition, the civil law countries tend to have overall stock
markets with relatively large market capitalizations as well as relatively liquid stock market
trading.
Turning to the last section of both Panels in table 2. It reports the raw values of
country-level investor protection variables with high scores representing strong investor
protection. Based on the average and median value - obtained from the World Bank’s
Doing Business database for 2005-2009 - common law countries have a higher investor
protection across all the six factors8. Overall, among common law countries, Singapore
and Hong Kong represents best level of investor protection followed by Malaysia, India
and Thailand. While, except for South Korea, there is lack of substantial variation in the
investor protection environment among civil law countries.9
5DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) state that firms may have a high cash holding due to accumulated
free cash flow (incentivates a dividend increase) or to finance future growth (incentivates a dividend decrease).
6von Eije and Megginson (2008) argue that if if a company signals its quality by frequent reporting, it
does not pay cash dividends as frequently (negative impact on the likelihood to pay out) but if it does pay
out, it can pay more (positive for the amount paid).
7Chay and Suh (2009) envision ownership concentration as a sign of increased agency conflict between
the management and shareholders (negative relation on pay out) while Gopalan, Nanda and Seru, 2013,
interpret it to be a source of internal financing (positive relation on pay out).
8Except for the median for Regulatory Quality (RegQua) of civil law countries.
9The table reports noteworthy variation in creditor rights, LegRInd, across countries with similar legal
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[Please insert table 2 about here]
3.2 Industry-specific
In table 3 we not only present the distribution of our sample firms across different industries
(based on SIC Code classification) but we also report the average number of payers and
payout amount across industry sectors. As can be seen from the table, our sample does not
appear to be heavily weighted towards a particular industry and contains a broad cross-
sectional representation of industry sectors. The largest number of firms from a specific
sector, in our sample, comes from the machinery industry sector (1,244 firms or 21.30%)
closely followed by the food textiles and printing industry sector (1,014 firms or 17.36%).
The chemical and petroleum industry has the highest proportion (68.98%) of payers and
the highest median payout (US$ 0.49 million). Unsurprisingly, the highest amount of real
payout comes from the machinery industry sector (US$ 52,947 million, i.e., 19.93%). It is
followed by the wholesale and retail sector (US$ 37,552 million, i.e., 14.14%). However, the
transportation sector (US$ 14.82 million) and mining sector (US$ 13.63 million) report the
highest average dividend payouts per firm.
[Please insert table 3 about here]
3.3 Amount paid and payout pattern
In this section, unlike findings reported for the United States (Skinner, 2008), we document
a marked preponderance of cash dividends relative to share repurchases in Asia. We plot
the cash dividend pay out, share repurchases and total pay out, in figure 1, 1990 to 2009.
This figure shows that total payout is closely tied to cash dividends (66.6% - lowest - in 2000
to 99.6% - highest - in 1994 of total payout relates to cash dividends. The proportion of
share repurchases in total pay out diminishes significantly in 2008 and 2009). Furthermore,
as evident from the graph, fluctuations in total payout (from US$ 2.71 billion in 1990 to
US$ 43.65 billion in 2007) are not principally driven by fluctuations in aggregate share
repurchase amounts (which vary from US$ 0.02 billion in 1994 to US$ 6.64 billion in 2007)
but by cash dividend amounts of pay out (from US$ 2.64 billion in 1990 to US$ 38.24 in
2008). Taking these findings together, it is evident that cash dividends is the preferred
payout mechanism in Asia.
[Please insert figure 1 about here]
Turning to year-by-year pay out (both cash dividends and share repurchases), table 4,
reports a systematic year-by-year increase from 1990 to 2008 in dividend (share repurchase)
disclosures, from 216 in 1990 to 5,013 in 2008 (from 185 in 1990 to 4,263 in 2008) and also in
the number of dividend payers (share repurchasers), from 185 in 1990 to 3,157 in 2008 (from
origins, i.e common and civil law countries, as well as countries with similar protection of minority share-
holder rights, ShRights. For example, Thailand, a common law country, is ranked near the top of the list
(after Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong), in respect to minority shareholder rights, ShRights. Notwith-
standing, it is ranked near the lowest of the ten countries examined in respect to creditor rights, LegRInd
(just above Indonesia, Philippines and Taiwan).
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5 in 1990 to 724 in 2008). The joint execution of dividend pay out and share repurchases
has risen in a similar fashion (from 4 in 1990 to 584 in 2008)10. The observed rise in pay
out activity over the last two decades in Asia primarily stems from a striking increase in
the observed listings, from 2,059 listings in 1990 to 12,600 listings in 2009.
In table 4, it is evident that from 1990 to 2009, the total number of firms that conduct
share repurchases exclusively (1,091) or undertake dividend pay out and share repurchases
simultaneously (3,564) is small relative to the total number of firms which elect to pay cash
dividends exclusively (23,409). Furthermore, the relative unimportance of share repurchases
is also evident in average pay out amounts disbursed, in light of a significantly higher
average cash dividend pay out (US$ 5.03 million per observed firm) relative to average
share repurchase amounts (US$ 0.93 million per observed firm).
On examination of the pay out of that minority of firms which engages in share repur-
chases pay out activity, the average pay out (US$ 8.92 million per repurchasing firm) is
higher than the average pay out amount observed through cash dividends (US$ 8.21 million
per cash dividend payer). Therefore, as a result of the statistics depicted in the figure 1
and presented in table 4, we proceed to exclude share repurchases from our analyses. Share
repurchases activities in Asia not only account for a small fraction of total pay out thereby
failing to explain the fluctuation in total pay out amounts but they also stem from a small
subset of listed industrial firms.
[Please insert table 4 about here]
4 Empirical results - regression analysis
4.1 Payout theories and firm-specific characteristics
In table 5, we analyze the importance, in respect to Asian listed industrial firms payout
decisions and amounts of pay out, of different but potentially mutually inclusive payout
theories. We focus on aspects of agency conflicts and investor protection, in relation to
firm payout determination. We adopt logit and tobit regression models, and we account for
certain agency conflict effects (CASH, DAA, LR and OWN) as well as the financial phase
of the life-cycle of the firm (SIZE and RETE). In addition, we simultaneously account
for other important firm- and market-specific characteristics viz. EA, ERF, SDS, Private,
COM, StTraVal and StTraVol, related to pay out determination, as detailed in section 2.
The dependent variable for the decision to pay dividends (Panel A), modelled using the
logit regression, is a dummy variable. It has a value equal to one if a firm decides to pay
in a fiscal year, otherwise it is zero. We adopt the logit regression model to examine the
importance of well-known payout theories on a firm’s decision to pay cash dividends. The
dependent variable for the tobit regression (Panel B) is the natural logarithm of the amount
of cash dividends paid by cash dividend payers, in millions of US$ in 1990 prices. In this
model, we also account for the impact of the key dividend pay out theories on dividend pay
outs. Across the logit and tobit regression models, each reported coefficient is the average
of the nineteen regression coefficients over the nineteen-year sample period, 1990 to 2009.
10There is a marginal decline of approximately 5% in three of the five categories discussed above from
2008 to 2009 and a significant drop in actual repurchasing firms from 724 (2008) to 498 (2009).
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The average coefficient standard errors are calculated following the Fama-MacBeth (1973)
methodology.
It is especially interesting to note that well-known agency conflict variables, which
determine pay out, e.g. the leverage ratio (a negative effect on likelihood to pay, Brockman
and Unlu, 2009) and ownership concentration (a significant positive effect, Gopalan, Nanda
and Seru, 2013) and the country level investor protection dummy variable (COM) are of
first order importance, in respect to payout determination in Asia. Our main variable of
interest in this table, the common law dummy (COM) variable, is significantly positive
for both the likelihood to pay (1.706, t-stat=11.98) and amount paid (0.323, t-stat=4.72).
Consistent with the findings of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) in
an international setting (33 countries) and von Eije and Megginson (2008) in the European
Union (15 countries), we find, accounting for a wide variety of pay out determinants, that
Asian firms located in high investor protection regimes, i.e., common law countries, have a
greater tendency to payout and if they do so they tend to payout more.
Overall the regression results, provide evidence in support of the agency-cost based
lifecycle theory in the Asia setting. Our empirical findings are qualitatively consistent,
not only for the full Asia sample, but also for the blocks of civil law and common law
countries in respect to agency cost-based determinants (CASH, DAA, LR and OWN) and
key lifecycle determinats (SIZE and RETE) of dividend pay out. Additionally, our models
provide evidence in support of key traditional determinants of payout, like the positive effect
of the earnings ratio (EA) and the negative effect of income volatility (SDS). In line with
findings in the European Union (von Eije and Megginson, 2008), we report a markedly large
proportion of the payout amount emanating from previously state-owned privatized firms
(Private). Unlike the findings presented in Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), the
expected effect of the stock market size (StTraVal) and liquidity (StTraVol) is restricted,
in Asia, to the decision to pay out, and this is primarily driven by decisions in civil law
countries.
In summary, the payout policies of the industrial listed firms in the Asian markets are
operating in line with the extant literature, which reports findings from the United States
(Fama and French, 2001 and Skinner, 2008), the European Union (von Eije and Megginson,
2008) and the G-6 countries (Denis and Osobov, 2008). As a result, new findings concerning
dividend payout determination in these Asian markets, in respect to the importance of
distinctive creditor and minority shareholder rights is likely to have relevance even beyond
the Asia region.
[Please insert table 5 about here]
4.2 Investor protection and likelihood to pay
In table 6, we examine the impact of investor protection variables, LegRInd, ShRights and
RegQua, on the firm’s payout decision, while accounting for effects of the traditional pay
out determinants, in the period 2005 to 2009. We report models in respect to LegRInd,
ShRights, RegQua and overall investor protection in Panels A to D, respectively. Consistent
with findings reported in table 5, across the four models, our key traditional determinants
show the expected effects. In particular, firms with higher market capitalization (SIZE),
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profitability (EA), retained earnings (RETE) and ownership concentration (OWN) together
with lower debt levels (LR) and income volatility (SDS) are more likely to decide to pay
dividends. As previously suggested, this effect is increased if the firm is headquartered in
a relatively high investor protection regime (i.e. a common law country, COM) and if it is
listed on a relatively small (StTraVal) but highly liquid (StTraVol) stock exchange.
In Panel A, in line with findings reported in Brockman and Unlu (2009), the estimated
coefficients (t-statistics) of 0.010 (2.07) and 0.046 (1.98) for the creditor rights (LegRInd)
are positively significant and they support the substitution hypothesis of dividend pay
out, i.e., weak creditor rights lead managers to substitute restrictive dividend policies. In
Panel B, the coefficient of interest on minority shareholder rights (ShRights) switches from
significantly negative, -0.008, t-statistic = 3.22, (in support of the substitution hypothesis)
to significantly positive, 0.185, t-stat = 3.62, (in support of the outcome hypothesis, in
line with the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000), in respect to the
likelihood to pay. As a result, we leave interpretation of the effects of minority shareholder
rights (ShRights) to the fully parametrised model presented in Panel D, which accounts
for the three investor protection variables simultaneously. Next, in Panel C, we study
the importance of regulatory quality (RegQua), in respect to the likelihood to pay. The
coefficients (t-statistics) of especial interest, 0.005 (t-stat=3.77) and 0.022 (t-stat=2.38),
are positive and highly significant.
Finally, in Panel D, we report the simultaneously estimated effects of all three investor
protection variables (LegRInd, Shrights and RegQua), both alone and with the traditional
determinants of dividend pay out to act as control variables. We find significant and con-
sistent results in support of the substitution hypothesis of dividend pay out, across the two
models. The more extensive creditor rights and the weaker the rights of minority share-
holders, the more likely the decision to pay. Hence, the decision not to pay dividends,
i.e., an example of a restrictive dividend payout policy, is a substitute mechanism for weak
creditor and strong minority shareholder rights. This mechanism substitutes dividend re-
strictions, through contractual arrangements and informal agreements, for weak creditor
rights with a view to attaining reputational capital and reducing the cost of capital in the
future (Brockman and Unlu, 2009). At the same time, the decision to pay out substitutes
for weak minority shareholder rights, thus also attaining reputational capital. The findings
suggest the importance of creditor rights, in mitigating the agency costs of debt, in for-
mulating corporate payout policies in Asia. Notwithstanding, the influence of the minority
shareholder rights on the likelihood to pay out predominates, relative to the influence of
creditor rights.
[Please insert table 6 about here]
4.3 Investor protection and amount paid
In table 7, we examine the impact of investor protection variables, LegRInd, ShRights
and RegQua, both individually and simultaneously on the firm’s payout amount, while
accounting for effects of the traditional pay out determinants, in the period 2005 to 2009.
Our findings, in the Asia region, across the four models are in line with Fama and French
(2001). Larger firms (SIZE) with higher earnings and cash holdings (EA and CASH)
and a smaller investment opportunity set (DAA) pay significantly higher dividends. In
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addition, following findings reported in respect to firms in the European Union (von Eije
and Megginson, 2008), privatized firms (Private) and firms that frequently report their
earnings (on a quarterly basis) decide to pay more. It is interesting to note that our key
agency variables, leverage (LR) and ownership concentration (OWN) together with the
common law dummy (COM), in our tobit regressions, are generally insignificant in the
2005 to 2009 period.
In Panel A, we find that creditor rights (LegRInd) exhibit insignificant results across the
restricted model specification (-0.011, t-stat=-1.68) and the unrestricted model specification
(0.033, t-stat=1.74), where the latter estimate controls for the effects of traditional payout
determinants. In panel B, we show consistent positive effects of minority shareholder rights
(ShRights) across the restricted (0.078, t-stat=4.54) and unrestricted model specification
(0.208, t-stat=4.24). Therefore the outcome hypothesis is relevant in regard to minority
shareholder rights in respect to payout amounts. In panel C of table 7, similar to the
findings in regard to the likelihood to pay, the regulatory quality (RegQua) has a positive
and significant impact on the payout amount for both the restricted model specification
(0.022, t-stat=12.41) and the unrestricted model specification (0.019, t-stat=18.81).
Turning to Panel D, we report the effects of the three investor protection variables
simultaneously. We find consistent results in terms of sign and significance of coefficient
for both the restricted and the unrestricted model specifications. The higher the minority
shareholder rights (ShRights in Panel B, D) and the lower creditor rights (LegRInd in
Panel A-restricted specification, Panel D) the greater the payout amount. These results are
consistent with the outcome hypothesis of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
(2000) where the agency cost of equity plays a decisive role in management’s decision on
dividend amount. Taking the findings in Panel D together, they show a tension between
the influence of minority shareholders and bondholders rights, and this tension partially
determines firm payout amount. The influence of the minority share holder rights on the
dividend payout amount is markedly pronounced, relative to the influence of creditor rights.
[Please insert table 7 about here]
4.4 Robustness test
We adopt a logit regression model to conduct a number of additional hypotheses tests, in
respect to the influence of investor protection variables on the decision to initiate, omit,
markedly increase or decrease cash dividend pay outs (the latter are defined by more than
30% adjustments in payout amounts over consecutive fiscal years). The dependent variable
is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the event occurs, otherwise it is equal to zero.
The results are reported in table 8. In the model estimation, we account for the set of
traditional control variables previously outlined and we focus on the set of coefficients on
the investor protection variables.
In panel A, in respect to the decision to initiate dividends, we report a pronounced
positive effect of minority shareholder rights (0.198, t-stat=8.59) and a significant negative
effect of creditor rights (-0.137, t-stat=-2.67), on this decision. This finding qualifies the
results presented in table 6, which indicates opposing effects on the decision to pay out,
indicative of the importance of the substitution hypothesis. The latter findings should
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now be qualified in terms of the importance of the outcome hypothesis in the context of
decisions to initiate dividends. Turning to Panel B, following Dhillon and Johnson (1994)
and Chemmanur, He, Hu and Liu (2010), we study marked increases in dividend payment
amounts between consecutive fiscal years. In line with the dividend initiation findings, the
estimated coefficients for minority shareholder rights (0.233, t-stat=5.51) and creditor rights
(-0.114, t-stat=-2.74) are qualitatively similar for dividend increases. Hence, these latter
findings also support the importance of the outcome hypothesis. Specifically, the greater
investor entitlements, the greater the direct influence of the exercising of these entitlements
on dividend pay out. Turning to regulatory quality (RegQua), it exhibits a positive but
small influence on dividend initiation (0.009, t-stat=2.02) and a similar influence on marked
dividend pay out increases (0.010, t-stat=2.16).
Panels C and D report findings in respect to the importance of investor protection
variables on the decision to omit dividends (Brockman and Unlu, 2009) or to decrease
dividends markedly. The findings suggest evidence, building on earlier findings in table 6,
that the substitution hypothesis is important, in respect to creditor rights. A weakening
of creditor rights (ShRights and RegQua do not significantly effect these decisions) results
in a restriction of dividend policies, either in terms of a dividend omission or a pronounced
decline in dividends. The implication is that such adjustments in dividends will reassure
bondholders of the reputation of the firm in regard to the protection of their prospects
as claimants on the firm’s cash flows. It is envisaged that this should have a diminishing
effect, other things equal, on the cost of debt in the firm’s capital structure. There is no
significant effect, documented in Panels C and D, in respect to minority shareholder rights.
Consistent with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000), it is noteworthy
that the outcome hypothesis effects of payout determination, reported in Panels A and B,
are markedly stronger than the substitution effects (following Brockman and Unlu, 2009)
of payout determination, reported in Panels C and D. Firm pay outs are principally char-
acterised, from an agency conflicts perspective, by competing entitlements across minority
shareholders and bondholders, as opposed to the importance of reputational effects.
[Please insert table 8 about here]
5 Conclusion
In this article, we study the principal-agent relation and associated agency conflicts in
respect to corporate payout determination in Asia. In particular, we examine the relative
importance of distinctive creditor and minority shareholder rights in respect to payout
policy determination across a variety of investor protection environments present in the
region.
Our study of the effects of the principal-agent relation on firm payout policy is conducted
with considerable novelty. In this study, we examine the Asian markets, availing of a
dynamic measurement, 2005 through to 2009, of creditor and minority shareholder rights.
In contrast, Brockman and Unlu (2009) avail of a static measurement of creditor rights over
time. Furthermore, we account for additional effects on the dividend decisions studied,
relative to those effects accounted for in Brockman and Unlu (2009). In particular, we
extend the set of control variables used by these authors to also account for the effects
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of ownership concentration (Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001 and Chemmanur, He, Hu and
Liu, 2010), earnings reporting frequency (von Eije and Megginson, 2008), stock market
liquidity and market capitalization (Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2006) as well the
effects of income risk (von Eije and Megginson, 2008) and privatization (Megginson, Nash
and Randenborgh, 1994 and von Eije and Megginson, 2008) on firm payout policy. Finally,
following Brockman and Unlu (2009), in respect to the determination of dividend policies,
we consider the determination of dividend omissions but we also consider the determination
of dividend initiations, large dividend increases and large dividend reductions.
Several of our main findings are consistent with the findings reported in earlier studies.
We find, in line with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) and Harford,
Mansi and Maxwell (2008), that the Asian firms located in relatively high investor protec-
tion, common law countries, have a greater tendency to pay out and, if they do so, they tend
to pay out more. Second, we examine the importance of distinctive creditor and minority
shareholder rights in respect to payout policy determination. Consistent with reported
findings of Brockman and Unlu (2009) and Chae, Kim and Lee (2009), we show that the
ongoing decision to pay out (exclusive of the dividend initiation decision) is conducted to
promote, from the perspectives of creditors and minority shareholders, the reputation of
the firm.
Concurrently, we do show, however, that the amount of payout of firms in Asia is
principally determined by the balance of the ‘stakeholders rights’ and the corresponding
capacities of debt and equity claimants to influence firm dividend policy. This veritable
confrontation, between creditor and minority shareholder entitlements, is pre-eminent in
influencing insiders to retain or disgorge amounts of cash (small and large) as well as
the decision to initiate cash dividends. Finally, unlike in the extant literature we find a
different relative importance of the agency costs of debt and equity on firm payout policy
determination. In Brockman and Unlu (2009), a conclusion is drawn in regard to the
decisive role of the agency costs of debt in determining dividend policies relative to that
of the reported agency costs of equity. In contrast, our findings indicate that creditors
exert significant and far reaching influence over corporate payout policy decision-making,
however, in Asia at least, the importance of the agency costs of equity predominate.
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Figure 1: Cash dividends, share repurchases and total payout amounts as
real (1990 prices), billions of US$, by the listed industrial firms in Asia, 1990
to 2009
Notes. The figure’s key is explained as follows. The reference Cash Dividends, Share Repurchases and Total
Payout refers to the real total amounts paid (in billions of US$, 1990 prices), in each specific year from 1990
to 2009. Total Payout is the sum of Cash Dividends and Share Repurchases. The set of ten Asian countries
in our sample comprises China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan and Thailand.
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Table 1: Description of the variables used in the regression models
Variables Definition
Cash Dividends The total real (1990 prices) amount of common cash dividend distributed by the
(RDIV) firm, in millions of US$.
Share Repurchase The total real (1990 prices) amount of share repurchases conducted by the firm,
(RSR) in millions of US$.
Market Value The percentile ranking of a firm with respect to its market value, on an annual
(SIZE) basis.
Earnings Ratio (EA) The firm earnings before interest but after tax as a percentage total assets.
Cash Holding The sum of cash and short term investments as a percentage of total assets of
(CASH) the firm.
Asset Growth The relative (percentage) change of the total assets in real (1990 prices) millions
(DAA) of US$.
Leverage Rate The sum of short-term and long-term debt as a percentage of the total assets of
(LR) the firm.
Retained Earnings The retained earnings as a percentage of the market value of firm equity.
(RETE)
Earning Reporting The frequency at which earnings are reported per annum. (1 to 4 times).
Frequency (ERF) 1 = Annual, 2 = Biannual and 4 = Quarterly Reporting.
Income Risk The standard deviation of the net income as a fraction of total sales over the
(SDS) most recent five years including the current fiscal year.
Ownership The number of shares held by the insiders (shareholders who hold 5% or more of
(OWN) the outstanding shares, such as officers, directors, immediate families, other
firms or individuals) as a percentage of the total number of outstanding common
shares.
Privatized A dummy variable, which indicates whether a company is privatized; Private = 1,
(Private) otherwise zero. Privatization means the firm was once owned by the state.
Common Law (COM) A dummy variable, which indicates whether a company originates from a common
law country; COM = 1, otherwise zero. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998, 2000) and Brockman and Unlu (2009)
Stocks Traded The total value of shares traded during the period as a percentage of GDP.
Value (StTraVal) Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Stocks Traded This is a turnover ratio. It is the total value of shares traded during the period
Volume (StTraVol) divided by the average market capitalization for the period.




Legal Rights The legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy
Index (LegRInd) laws protect the rights of the borrowers and lenders. Strength of the index
(0=weak to 10=strong). Source: World Bank’s Doing Business Database.
Shareholder The shareholders index reflects the ability of shareholders to sue officers and
Rights Index directors for misconduct. Strength of index (0=weak to 10=strong).
(ShInd) Source: World Bank’s Doing Business Database.
Directors The director’s liability index, with higher values indicating the greater liability
Liability Index of directors. Strength of index (0=weak to 10=strong).
(DirLia) Source: World Bank’s Doing Business Database.
Disclosure The disclosure index measures the extent to which investors are protected throug
Index (DisInd) disclosure of ownership and financial information. Strength of index (0=weak to
10=strong). Source: World Bank’s Doing Business Database.
Shareholder The average of the Shareholder Rights Index (ShInd), Directors Liability Index
Rights (DirLia) and the Disclosure Index (DisInd). Strength of the index (0=weak to
(ShRights) 10=strong). Source: World Bank’s Doing Business Database.
Regulatory The regulatory quality index reflects the percentile rank which captures perceptions
Quality of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and
(RegQua) regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Strength of the
index. Source: World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators.
Constant The intercept of the regression equation.
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Table 2: Summary statistics - Firm-specific and country-level data
Panel A: Common law countries
Country Hong Kong India Malaysia Singapore Thailand Common law
countries
Firms 655 1369 696 363 397 3480
Private 11 33 3 0 6 53
N 7090 8374 7439 3698 4519 31120
Payers 3829 5645 4927 2542 2915 19858
Payout 56812 19154 22451 25797 15097 139312
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Firm-specific variables
RDIV 8.0 0.4 2.3 0.2 3.0 0.3 7.0 0.7 3.3 0.4 4.5 0.3
RSR 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0
SIZE 50.2 48.5 42.2 38.4 41.8 36.9 48.1 45.2 34.8 28.3 43.5 39.9
EA 0.1 4.8 8.2 8.3 4.1 5.0 4.2 5.3 5.4 6.8 4.5 6.3
CASH 39.4 34.5 12.9 6.8 24.9 17.4 33.0 27.7 22.3 14.1 25.2 17.1
DAA 10.2 6.7 9.0 5.6 4.4 3.4 9.2 6.4 4.2 4.2 7.5 5.1
LR 21.6 16.4 33.0 32.7 24.0 21.0 21.4 18.0 33.1 28.7 27.0 23.5
RETE -11.4 33.1 9.6 0.7 3.5 25.7 3.7 27.7 -19.4 16.4 -2.4 25.6
ERF 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.0 3.3 4.0 2.3 2.0 3.1 4.0 2.5 2.0
SDS 40.3 6.3 10.6 3.1 15.7 4.3 13.2 3.9 14.0 4.0 19.3 4.1
OWN 58.6 60.3 51.2 51.3 52.1 52.8 57.9 59.5 56.3 56.6 54.0 54.9
Macroeconomic variables
StTraVal 209.5 140.1 44.4 43.2 71.9 44.1 93.4 84.2 41.7 40.2 85.8 52.6
StTraVol 57.0 52.4 84.4 84.2 39.8 33.3 61.6 54.7 83.7 84.4 67.9 56.8
Investor protection variables
LegRInd 10.0 10.0 7.2 7.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 4.0 4.0 8.2 8.0
SHInd 8.8 9.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 9.0 9.0 6.0 6.0 7.4 7.0
DirLia 8.0 8.0 4.0 4.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 4.0 2.0 6.3 7.0
DisInd 10.0 10.0 7.0 7.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 8.8 10.0
ShRights 8.9 9.0 6.0 6.0 8.7 8.7 9.3 9.3 6.7 6.0 7.5 7.7
RegQua 98.9 99.8 43.7 43.9 66.1 66.3 99.4 99.5 61.1 61.0 66.4 63.3
Panel B: Civil law countries
Country China Indonesia Philippines South Korea Taiwan Civil law
countries
Firms 686 276 121 620 657 2360
Private 15 7 3 1 6 32
N 2790 3182 1456 7276 6954 21658
Payers 1769 1510 424 4881 3929 12513
Payout 38167 4710 1681 32429 49350 126336
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Firm-specific variables
RDIV 13.7 0.6 1.5 0.0 1.2 0.0 4.5 0.4 7.1 0.5 5.8 0.3
RSR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 4.8 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.9 0.0
SIZE 75.4 77.7 37.2 31.2 36.2 29.5 48.7 46.0 65.0 67.1 57.6 61.4
EA 4.2 4.8 4.4 6.2 2.0 3.8 3.9 5.4 5.5 5.5 4.4 5.2
CASH 35.7 32.2 25.5 18.9 31.8 21.4 23.9 19.2 32.6 28.4 30.1 25.5
DAA 13.5 9.7 -3.7 -3.6 -0.2 -3.3 3.3 4.3 6.9 4.7 6.0 4.8
LR 27.6 26.2 37.0 31.3 22.9 16.6 31.1 30.1 22.4 21.5 28.1 25.8
RETE -2.9 11.0 -17.8 22.1 -10.9 17.0 8.7 18.3 -0.6 11.9 -2.3 13.0
ERF 3.1 4.0 3.0 4.0 2.9 4.0 1.8 1.0 2.2 2.0 2.5 2.0
SDS 12.4 2.6 20.2 5.3 48.5 8.4 11.0 2.6 7.3 3.6 13.3 3.2
OWN 56.6 56.5 68.0 69.9 72.0 75.3 38.4 38.1 27.7 24.0 44.5 42.1
Macroeconomic variables
StTraVal 50.7 29.9 11.2 9.7 12.5 10.5 101.8 97.3 255.3 258.1 115.4 60.2
StTraVol 152.7 132.1 52.7 42.7 25.2 23.5 190.9 177.7 247.3 207.9 171.4 174.1
Investor protection variables
LegRInd 4.8 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 7.0 7.0 3.3 3.0 4.7 4.0
SHInd 3.6 4.0 3.0 3.0 8.0 8.0 7.0 7.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
DirLia 1.0 1.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 2.6 2.0
DisInd 10.0 10.0 9.2 9.0 2.0 2.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.9 7.0
ShRights 4.9 5.0 5.7 5.7 4.0 4.0 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.3
RegQua 43.5 44.8 36.8 37.6 53.5 52.3 72.6 72.8 82.3 83.3 61.7 69.3
Notes. The table shows the firm-specific and country-specific summary statistics for our set of ten Asian
countries, 1990 to 2009. Firms refer to the number of firms in a particular country. Private refers to the
number of privatized firms in a country. N refers to the number of dividend discloser (firm-year) observations.
Payers refers to the number of payout observation and Payout refers to the total amount paid as cash dividend,
in real (1990 prices) millions of US$. For references, definitions and the construction of the firm-specific,
macroeconomic and investor protection variables, please refer to the table 1.
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